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FOREWORD 
As one of the largest producers and consumers of nonfuel minerals, the United States 
greatly influences mineral markets and trade worldwide. Historically, the country has fol-
lowed a policy of relatively free trade in mineral commodities, encouraging consumers to 
search abroad for low-cost supplies, and producers to sell wherever the price is highest. Of 
course, there are exceptions, but overall public policy favors trade, allowing huge quantities 
of minerals to flow across the country's borders. 
In recent years, particularly as worldwide recession and depressed commodity mar-
kets have battered domestic mineral producers, a growing number of voices have called 
for a change in this policy, for more protection and greater domestic self sufficiency. 
Should such a change occur on a significant scale, it would have obvious, and serious, 
implications for every major mineral producing and consuming country. Even the modest 
movements toward protection over the last few years clearly demonstrate the potential of 
such a change to disrupt the existing economic and political relations among nations. 
So it was without hesitation that I accepted an invitation to participate with Hans 
Landsberg in a Forum sponsored by Resources for the Future in the fall of 1982, which 
examined U.S. national interests and policies for three groups of natural resources -
energy, minerals, and food. We were asked to focus on minerals. 
The resulting paper, reprinted here, was originally published in Emery N. Castle and 
Kent A. Price, editors, U.S. Interests & Global Natural Resources: Energy, Minerals, Food 
(1983). This volume, which is available from Johns Hopkins University Press, also in-
cludes chapters on "The International Dimension" by Emery N. Castle and Kent A. Price, 
"Energy Is an International Good" by Milton Russell with Mary Beth Zimmerman, "The 
Internationalization of U.S. Agriculture" by Dale E. Hathaway, "U.S. Foreign Policy and 
Global Natural Resources" by Carl Kaysen, and "The Inevitability of the Unexpected" by 
McGeorge Bundy. 
JOHN E. TILTON 
Research Leader 
Mineral Trade and Markets Project 
chapter three 
Nonfuel Minerals-
The Fear of Shortages 
and the Search for Policies 
John E. Tilton 
Hans H. Landsberg 
Nonfuel minerals for some years have been greatly overshadowed by 
energy, and with good reason. The value of their combined U.S. 
production, for example, does not match that of either oil or natural 
gas and only moderately exceeds that of coal (figure 3-1). Similarly, 
U.S. net expenditures on nonfuel mineral imports are only a small 
percentage of its net outlays for the energy it acquires from abroad. 
In 1980 that percentage was as low as 5 percent. In 1981 it slightly 
exceeded 15 percent (figure 3-2). Between 1979 and 1981 the country's 
annual net trade bill for nonfuel minerals averaged only $6 billion. 
Editors' note: This chapter draws heavily on three previous works that the reader 
may wish to consult for additional detail: Hans H. Landsberg, "Key Elements Common 
to Critical Issues on Engineering Materials and Minerals," Paper presented at the 
Seventh Biennial Conference on National Materials Policy, July 19-22, 1982, Harpers 
Ferry, West Virginia; Hans H. Landsberg and John E. Tilton, with Ruth B. Haas, 
"Nonfuel Minerals," in Paul R. Portney, ed., Current Issues in Natural Resource Policy 
(Baltimore, Md., Johns Hopkins University Press for Resources for the Future, 1982) 
pp. 74-116; and John E. Tilton, The Future of Nonfuel Minerals (Washington, D.C., 
Brookings Institution, 1977). 
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Figure 3-1. U.S. fuel and nonfuel minerals production for 1981, in billions of 
dollars. Data are from Minerals Yearbook, Centennial Edition, vol. 1, 1981, 
table lO; and Energy Information Administration, Annual Report to Congress, 
1981. 
Minerals differ from energy in other respects as well, and strikingly 
so. While in energy the spotlight shines brightest on oil, the source 
that is highest in value, public and policy concern in minerals focuses 
on a few commodities that carry a relatively low price tag. The big-
ticket items-steel, copper, nickel, and aluminum-are not free of 
problems, to be sure, but rightly or wrongly they are not these days 
thought of as constituting the core of the minerals problem. Under the 
latter rubric fall a few metallic minerals such as cobalt, chromium, 
manganese, and platinum, none of which is produced in significant 
quantities in the United States and each of which runs up an annual 
import bill of $250 to $500 million, an amount equal to one to two 
days of imported petroleum (figure 3-3). Moreover, within the nonfuels 
group, the value at the mine of domestic production of nonmetallic 
exceeds that of metallic minerals by about two to one. Casual observers 
are surprised to discover that the combined value of U.S. output of 
stone, sand and gravel, and cement exceeds that of all metallic ores 
taken together (figure 3-4). 
Yet another distinction is location. Secure foreign sources of minerals 
greatly outweigh insecure sources: Canada, Australia, Brazil, Peru, 
Mexico, and Venezuela are large suppliers to the United States. 
Canada, for example, sells to the United States more than forty, 
Mexico twenty, and Australia ten types of nonfuel minerals. The 
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Figure 3-2. U.S. gross and net imports of fossil fuels and nonfuel minerals for 
1981, in billions of dollars. Note that oil includes strategic reserve imports. 
Data are from Minerals Yearbook, Centennial Edition, vol. 1, table 10; and 
Energy Information Administration, Annual Report to Congress, 1981. 
annual value of mineral imports from Canada alone represents between 
one-fourth and one-third of all U.S. nonfuel mineral imports. Compared 
with oil, then, nonfuel mineral exports to the United States are widely 
scattered, and to a substantial degree shipped from politically stable 
countries. Minerals exported from South Africa and the Soviet Union 
inject a note of concern, however, which will be di;cussed later. 
Further differences are that, given the large variety of nonfuel 
minerals and nonmineral materials, significantly more opportunity 
exists for substitution among minerals than in energy. And unlike 
energy, nonfuel minerals are not destroyed in use. They differ in 
difficulty and cost of recovery, but in principle the stock is not 
significantly diminished, so much so that the phrase "above-ground" 
stocks has been coined to denote minerals in and after useful employ-
ment. Such differences caution against casual analogies between fuel 
and nonfuel minerals. They also suggest that conclusions and policy 
recommendations relevant for energy may not be appropriate for 
nonfuel minerals. 
Despite their relatively small contribution to the gross national 
product and the balance of trade, a continuous flow of nonfuel minerals 
is essential to sustain the country's industrial base and to maintain its 
high standard of living. In addition, many mineral commodities pro-
duced in relatively small quantities are critical ingredients in specialty 
2000 
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Figure 3-3. U.S. nonfuel gross mineral imports valued at more than $100 
million each in 1981. Data are from Minerals Yearbook, Centennial Edition , 
vol. 1, table 10; and Energy Information Administration, Annual Report to 
Congress, 1981. 
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Figure 3-4. Ten largest nonfuel and metallic minerals produced in the U.S. in 
1981, in billions of dollars. Data are from Minerals Yearbook, Centennial 
Edition, vol. 1, table 10; and Energy Information Administration, Annual 
Report to Congress, 1981. 
materials used in the manufacture of military and other high-technology 
equipment. 
So it is not surprising that from time to time concern arises in the 
United States and other industrialized countries over the future 
sustained availability of nonfuel minerals, even though the relatively 
low values suggest that the situation is amenable to management. In 
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So it is not surprising that from time to time concern arises in the 
United States and other industrialized countries over the future 
sustained availability of nonfuel minerals, even though the relatively 
low values suggest that the situation is amenable to management. In 
this chapter, we first examine the nature of these fears and provide a 
framework for categorizing them. We then focus on efforts through 
mineral policies to cope with perceived threats. More specifically, we 
consider the evolution of past policy, the current interest in mineral 
self-sufficiency and protectionism, and possible alternative policies for 
reducing the vulnerability associated with mineral import dependence. 
Shortages and Fears 
To most economists, a shortage occurs when the available supply of 
a commodity is not sufficient at the prevailing price to satisfy demand. 
This means that a shortage can be eliminated simply by allowing price 
to rise. At some point, the higher price will adequately stimulate supply 
and reduce demand to bring the two into balance. 
For our purposes, however, and we believe for policy decisions as 
well, this is too narrow a definition. While an increase in price can 
constrict demand to the available supply, it creates dislocation and 
hardship for those consumers who find they no longer can afford to 
buy the commodity. The higher price may bring supply and demand 
into balance, but at a cost that society may not be prepared to pay. 
So here we define shortages more broadly to include situations where 
demand substantially exceeds supply at the prevailing price, as well 
as where price rises sharply in the short run or persistently in real 
terms over the long run. Armed with this definition, we now proceed 
to examine the different reasons why mineral shortages might occur. 
Resource Depletion-A Long-Run Challenge 
for Technology 
The first step in mineral production is extraction or mining. As known 
deposits are depleted, new ones must be discovered or eventually 
shortages arise. 
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Two very different views of this potential problem are found in the 
literature. The physical view, in logic both simple and appealing, points 
out that since the world is finite, the available amount of a mineral 
commodity is a fixed stock; this is so regardless of whether we are 
able to see its magnitude or boundaries at any given time. Demand, 
on the other hand, is a flow variable that continues year after year. 
As a result, it is only a matter of time before the latter consumes the 
former and the world faces shortages. Many who adhere to this view 
often see the end coming sooner rather than later, as they believe 
demand is growing exponentially over time. Probably the best-known 
example of this view is found in Limits to Growth. 1 
The second--or economic view--of resource exhaustion does not 
envisage the world literally running out of mineral commodities, but 
instead anticipates a persistent climb in real prices over time as the 
better, low-cost, mines are depleted and the world is forced to turn to 
poorer grade, more remote, and more difficult to process deposits-
all characteristics that spell rising costs. 
Physical versus economic. While the ultimate effect could be just 
as adverse if higher prices eventually force most or all consumers to 
do without, there are important differences between these two per-
spectives. Under the economic view, shortages resulting from resource 
exhaustion do not occur suddenly without warning, like a speeding 
automobile with a broken fuel gauge that runs out of gas. Rather, they 
take place slowly over a long period as prices rise higher and higher. 
There is time to adjust to adverse consequences. More important, 
shortages are not inevitable: while the depletion of low-cost mineral 
deposits tends to push prices upward, other developments and, in 
particular, technological change, can partially or totally offset this 
tendency. And while nonfuel minerals may be widely dispersed or 
degraded when used, they are not destroyed, though in a given instance 
cost may prevent recovery. 
The future availability of nonfuel minerals thus hangs largely on the 
outcome of the race over the long run between the cost-increasing 
effects of depletion and the cost-reducing effects of new technology. 
In the past, technology clearly has won. The real cost of producing 
mineral commodities has declined substantially over the last century. 2 
Whether this will continue to be the case indefinitely is hotly debated. 
Optimists point to the past and cite earlier prophecies of doom that 
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never have come to pass, and argue that there is no reason to believe 
the future will not unfold as has the past. They extol human ingenuity 
and note that impending shortages and higher prices encourage the 
technological progress needed to keep them from actually occurring. 
Pessimists, on the other hand, argue that the past probably is a poor 
guide to the future, especially in light of the tremendous growth in 
aggregate mineral demand during the last fifty years. They charge the 
optimists with blind faith in a technological "fix" to the depletion 
problem and consider this both simplistic and dangerous. Some also 
argue that the past record is deceptive in that material costs have 
declined largely because environmental costs associated with produc-
tion have not been paid. 
Which of these two views is closer to the truth, we simply do not 
know. Indeed, given the inherent uncertainty surrounding the future 
course of technological progress, there probably is no way of finding 
out: an early end to the debate is unlikely. 
We suggest, however, that resource depletion does not pose an early 
threat. In particular, reserves-that is, the quantity of the mineral 
commodity in discovered deposits that are economic to mine given 
current prices and technology-are for most mineral commodities 
sufficient to last for the next thirty to fifty years, and for some way 
beyond. Moreover, where this is not the case, submarginal deposits 
are readily available that could be profitably exploited with only modest 
increases in prices. 
In summary, for the near-to-middle term, future resource exhaustion 
does not appear to be a serious problem. Whether this happy situation 
will continue into the more distant future, we do not know and, indeed, 
cannot know. The answer depends on how successful technology is 
at holding the cost-increasing pressures of depletion at bay. 
Investment-Two Conflicting Views 
Even with high-quality reserves, shortages can arise if investment in 
mines and processing facilities is insufficient. Such shortages are likely 
to be self-correcting, for the surge in prices they generate normally 
will induce the needed investment. Still, new capacity cannot be built 
overnight. Major new mines, particularly those in remote and unde-
veloped areas, may take from five to seven years to bring into operation. 
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Ports, rail lines and roads, power plants, town sites, and other facilities 
may take as long to construct as the mines themselves. Naturally, if 
new capacity can be added by expanding existing facilities or by 
developing mines in established mining districts, the time required is 
shorter. Even in such cases, however, the delivery, installation, and 
breaking in of new equipment usually takes at least two years from 
the decision to proceed. Consequently, shortages caused by insufficient 
investment, though temporary and self-correcting, can cause serious 
problems for several years. 
In examining the likelihood of such shortages, one again finds two 
very different views. Some observers are greatly concerned that we 
are not developing new mines and processing facilities to meet 
inescapable future demand. Many who adhere to this position are 
associated with major mining firms, which gives rise to suspicion that 
their alarm is self-serving. Yet these individuals as a rule are intimately 
familiar with their industries. They can cite the new mines being 
developed, where they are, and when they will be on-stream. They 
know the projects that have been stretched out, postponed, or can-
celed-the casualties of current market conditions. And they are 
familiar with how demand has grown in the past and have considerable 
experience in projecting it into the future. When questioned as to why 
they are not building more new capacity to take advantage of the 
favorable market conditions that the predicted shortage should produce, 
they point out that low profits and depressed stock prices make it 
impossible for them to generate internally the necessary funding. 
External funding from banks and other financial institutions, they 
argue, also is unavailable, not because the capital market has dried 
up, but rather because lenders-either conservative or myopic-will 
not lend large sums on the expectation that future requirements will 
drive prices up to profitable levels. 
The opposing view, not surprisingly espoused by many members of 
the financial community, holds that the capital markets suffer from 
neither myopia nor other imperfections. Rather, adherents of this view 
maintain that external funding will be readily and amply available just 
as soon as there is some credible evidence that additional capacity is 
needed and will earn a competitive rate of return. They note that over 
the last decade the mineral industries in general have suffered from 
excess capacity, which has kept prices and profits depressed. They 
question whether economic growth in the industrialized nations during 
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the rest of this century will recapture the vitality it displayed during 
the 1950s and 1960s. If, as is widely believed, long-run economic 
growth will continue to be slow, they are not convinced that investment 
in the mineral sector indeed is inadequate and that serious shortages 
loom as a result. 
Both views seem plausible. However, some evidence does exist 
indicating that mineral firms begin more new investment projects when 
markets are booming and delay or cancel more projects when markets 
are depressed. 3 Given the long gestation period involved in bringing a 
new mine or processing facility on-stream, ·one would expect new 
investments to be undertaken in response solely to long-run growth 
trends. The fact that temporary, short-term market fluctuations appear 
to be important as well suggests that current conditions may unduly 
influence the long-run view of the market held by investors. This lends 
some support to the view that investors are myopic, and that by 
discouraging adequate investment in new mineral capacity, current 
depressed market conditions are sowing the seeds of future shortages. 
Interruptions in Trade-The Problem 
of Import Dependence 
Even with ample reserves and adequate investment, shortages still 
may occur because of interruptions in mineral production or trade, 
and unexpected short-term surges in demand. The first of these potential 
problems is examined in this section, the second in the next. 
As with oil, strikes, natural disasters, embargoes, war, and a host 
of other factors can threaten the flow of mineral commodities to U.S. 
consumers. Neither domestic nor foreign supplies are immune to such 
interruptions. U.S. copper production, for example, in the past has 
been shut down for months by industry-wide strikes. Similarly, low 
snow cover in the Pacific Northwest on occasion has seriously curtailed 
hydroelectric power generation and, in tum, aluminum reduction 
located in that part of the country. 
Still, the United States depends heavily on foreign producers for 
bauxite, cobalt, chromium, manganese, nickel, tin, and other important 
metals, as figure 3-5 indicates. Much of the recent public concern over 
possible shortages has focused on the possibility that these essential 
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imports will be restricted or cut off. Threats posed by cartels, 
embargoes, civil disruptions, and a "resource war" have been singled 
out for particular attention. Indeed, it would be fair to say that this 
area constitutes "the minerals problem" for many participants and 
observers. Because it is sensational stuff, it dominates the treatment 
of minerals in the news media, to the detriment, we believe, of serious 
long-range but more pedestrian issues, such as investment. Yet, 
because it looms so large in the public debate, we deal with it in some 
detail. 
Cartels 
Following the sharp increases in oil prices in 1974, it was widely 
believed that other mineral producers soon would join together and 
raise their prices. At first, a number of events seemed to bear this out. 
Unilateral price increases by Jamaica on bauxite and by Morocco on 
phosphate rock, which were followed by a number of other producing 
countries, appeared to confirm this concern. So, too , did the flurry of 
activity at about this time that led to the formation of producer 
associations in iron ore, bauxite, and other mineral commodities. 
It now is clear that the danger of cartels in the nonfuel minerals 
sector was exaggerated, if not wholly unfounded. The association of 
major copper-exporting countries tried and failed to restrict output and 
maintain prices. Morocco and other phosphate rock producers soon 
had to rescind their price increases. Jamaica and the other Caribbean 
bauxite-producing countries that followed its lead in raising export 
taxes watched helplessly as new investment moved to other countries 
and their own enterprises stagnated. 
To assess the future prospects for cartels, it is important to know 
why the expectations following the oil price increase were not realized . 
Are there fundamental differences between oil and the nonfuel minerals 
that preclude the successful creation of nonfuel cartels? Or does the 
explanation lie more in the long, deep slumber that overtook most 
mineral markets during the mid-1970s? If the latter is true, does this 
mean that new cartel efforts can be anticipated once the world economy 
recovers, and that these efforts then are likely to be more successful? 
In answering such questions, we need to examine the conditions 
that favor the formation and maintenance of cartels. The number of 
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such factors is quite large, but for our purposes they can be conveniently 
consolidated into four necessary conditions. 
Limited membership. First, the number of major producing and 
exporting countries must be limited. The difficulties of reaching an 
agreement on market share, price, and other terms, acceptable to all 
parties, increase sharply with the number of potential participants. For 
most mineral commodities, this condition is satisfied, as 75 percent or 
more of world mine output comes from the eight largest producing 
countries. For chromium, nickel, platinum, tin, and many other metals, 
the level of concentration exceeds 90 percent. 
Inelastic demand. Second, the responsiveness or elasticity of 
demand to changes in price must be small . Otherwise, any effort to 
raise price will cause a sharp loss of sales and result in lower rather 
than higher profits. 
This condition is satisfied for most minerals in the short run-up to 
three years or so-but not in the long run. The reason for this is that 
minerals are used primarily to make metals and other materials, which 
in turn are inputs into final consumer and producer goods. Rarely do 
they constitute more than a small percentage of the total costs of the 
final goods in which they are embodied. The steel in an automobile, 
for example, accounts for no more than 5 percent to 10 percent of a 
car's price, and the cost of the copper or aluminum is even less 
significant. This means that the price of a mineral commodity can rise 
significantly without greatly affecting the price and hence output of 
the final goods from which its own demand is derived. Any significant 
decline in the demand for a mineral commodity caused by a rise in its 
price comes about through efforts by the manufacturers of final goods 
to substitute other, now ch"aper, materials. While such substitutions 
often are possible, few can be made quickly. In the production of 
automobiles, for example, plastics and other materials can be used in 
place of aluminum, but such changes take several years to incorporate 
into the production process. It is for this reason that demand responds 
little to a change in price in the short run , but much more over the 
longer run. 
Inelastic supply. Third, the responsiveness or elasticity of supply 
outside the control of cartel members must be small. Otherwise, an 
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increase in price will result in a sharp loss of market share for cartel 
members, as producers elsewhere expand their output. 
Once again, it is necessary to differentiate between the short and 
long term. As noted earlier, it takes from three to seven years to build 
new mines and processing facilities. Consequently, if an industry is 
operating at capacity and if available private and public stocks are 
small, prices can rise sharply in the short run without attracting much 
additional supply into the market. Over the long run, however, this is 
not the case, for sufficient time exists for building new capacity outside 
the control of the cartel. 
Cartel cohesion. Fourth, the bonds among cartel members must 
be strong enough to prevent individual members from deserting the 
cartel or secretly cheating. The history of most mineral cartels again 
indicates that this condition may hold in the short run, but not over 
the long. Few cartels celebrate their fifth birthday, and only the rare 
exceptions have lasted ten years or longer. The DeBeers Central Selling 
Organization, which for almost a century now has controlled the world 
diamond market, truly is unique in this respect. 
Just why the bonds holding most cartels together dissolve after a 
few years is not entirely clear. Presumably the explanation lies largely 
with the increased difficulties of keeping all members satisfied when 
the cartel's total market and profits are being eroded by the increased 
output of outside suppliers and by the substitution of alternative 
materials by consumers. And it is, of course, true that any member 
for which a short-term advantage is critical can reap it by violating 
cartel terms. 
These considerations suggest that the necessary conditions for 
successful mineral cartels may be satisfied in the short run, except 
where idle production capacity or significant stocks exist outside the 
control of the cartel. However, since these conditions do not hold in 
the long run, cartels once established are likely to founder within a 
few years. 
According to current conventional wisdom it seems irrational for 
producing countries to trade long-term market growth and profits for 
temporarily higher prices; therefore, mineral cartels are unlikely to 
arise even under better economic conditions. This conclusion, however, 
implicitly assumes that producing countries are fully aware of the 
adverse consequences associated with cartel participation, and that 
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their governments are not faced with such pressing problems that they 
feel compelled to maximize the immediate returns from their mineral 
sector, regardless of the longer-term consequences. Since these as-
sumptions may not always hold, future attempts to form mineral cartels 
cannot be completely ruled out. 
Embargoes 
Although both restrict trade, embargoes differ from cartels in several 
respects. Most basically, cartels are designed to raise the prices and 
profits realized by their members, while embargoes are imposed to 
relieve domestic shortages or to pressure foreign governments. For 
example, the United States on occasion has restricted exports of metal 
scrap to provide assistance to domestic consumers that claim they 
could not pay prices high enough to keep the scrap from flowing 
abroad. In a brief but celebrated instance in 1973, the U.S. government 
limited exports of soybeans to Japan and other countries to relieve 
excess pressure on supplies. This country's trading partners never fail 
to resurrect the memory of the soybean embargo whenever U.S. 
reliability as an exporter is discussed. 
Examples of embargoes to pressure foreign governments are equally 
easy to find. For many years, exports of chromium from Rhodesia 
(now Zimbabwe) were proscribed under United Nations sanctions in 
retaliation for that country's unilateral declaration of independence 
from the United Kingdom and for its racial policies. In 1973 the Arab 
oil-exporting countries embargoed exports to the Netherlands and the 
United States to protest Middle East policies of these two countries 
and, in particular, U.S. support for Israel. The United States itself for 
a long time prohibited trade in minerals and other commodities with 
mainland China, and still in.coses such sanctions on trade with Cuba. 
Perhaps of greater importance than the difference in objectives is 
the fact that embargoes may completely cut off trade. For example, 
those imposed for security reasons, such as sensitive military and 
high-technology goods and services, are designed precisely to prevent 
trade in those items. Obviously, cartels will not go to this extreme, 
for this would eliminate rather than increase member profits. 
Rarely are embargoes very successful, at least when imposed for 
political reasons. In addition, the long-run costs often are high for the 
imposing countries. Shortly after World War II, the Soviet Union 
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embargoed manganese shipments to the United States and other 
Western countries. At the time, this action created considerable 
concern, for the Soviet Union was a major world supplier of manganese. 
The result, however, was not the intended change in U.S. policies, 
but instead the development of new manganese mines in India and 
elsewhere and the loss of Soviet world markets for this mineral 
commodity. Similarly, U.S . trade sanctions against China and Cuba 
appear to have had little success in achieving their desired objectives. 
Nor have U.S. embargoes of grain shipments to the USSR, which 
merely shifted Soviet purchases to alternative suppliers , as world 
harvests were plentiful. 
Despite this poor record, embargoes continue to be attractive because 
they provide a visible means of expressing disapproval. When the use 
of stronger measures is ruled out, they give the appearance of bold 
action, whether or not they actually inflict any hardship on the offending 
country. Similarly, in countries beset by shortages and domestic 
inflation, they appear as constructive steps to the general public. In 
such situations, they even may provide some temporary relief, though 
at the expense of the country's foreign customers who are likely to 
turn to more reliable sources as soon as they are able. So, for 
appearances , governments are likely to continue to impose embargoes 
from time to time, and in the process disrupt the flow of mineral 
commodities in world trade. 
War and Civil Disruption 
Interruptions in mineral trade resulting from cartels and embargoes 
are the result of deliberate policies. With war and civil disruption, 
trade is more a hapless casualty of the breakdown in order. Twice 
during the late 1970s, for example, rebels based in Angola invaded the 
Shaba province of Zaire and overran that country's principal mining 
regions. As Zaire is the world's largest cobalt producer, the resulting 
interruption in production sent prices soaring and consumers in the 
United States and elsewhere scrambling for alternative sources of 
supply. 
Past and potential flashpoints that involve mineral supply cuts could 
be multiplied many fold, but the point needs no belaboring. Until the 
world is free of war and civil disruption, production and trade of 
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minerals-and other location-bound commodities-will continue to be 
vulnerable to such disturbances. 
Resource War 
Over the last several years, a school of thought has emerged, especially 
in the United States, warning of a "resource war" with the Soviet 
Union that threatens the security of mineral supplies from abroad, and 
particularly from southern Africa. In its most pointed version this is 
seen as part of a long-run comprehensive plan to deny the West access 
to the mineral wealth of southern Africa and as such is looked upon 
as complementing a Soviet desire to control the oil resources of the 
Middle East, with the invasion of Afghanistan as an alleged preliminary 
step. 
What is not clear in these speculations is how the Soviet Union 
could pursue a resource war (even assuming it actually wanted to: the 
evidence on that point is hardly convincing, as has been pointed out 
in some detail in a number of recent studies). 4 Clearly the country 
does not have the foreign exchange to outbid western consumers for 
mineral supplies from southern Africa. Moreover, even if it did, this 
only would raise prices and stimulate expanded sources of supply in 
the future. Nor does it seem likely that the Soviet Union is prepared 
to commit large numbers of its ground forces to the region, given the 
logistical difficulties and the political repercussions. If it were prepared 
to confront the West so openly, it would find the Middle East an easier 
and, with its oil, a more attractive target. The ups and downs in Soviet 
production and trade combined with the uncertainty surrounding 
statistical information leave a wide-open field for speculation about 
motivations of policy, but the resource war interpretation seems based 
on thin premises . 
This leaves the possibility of the Soviet Union's exploiting political 
and tribal conflicts and supporting indigenous opposition to South 
Africa and its racial policies. Such a strategy can be pursued with 
much less risk and cost. While offering the possibility of Soviet 
influence in the area, it is unlikely to lead to actual control. With fresh 
memories of their colonial past, the new nations of Africa will not 
meekly surrender their hard-won independence to a new foreign power. 
Moreover, their own national interests, not those of the Soviet Union 
or world socialism, are likely to receive highest priority. Indeed, Soviet 
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pressures to embargo mineral exports to the West probably would 
backfire, for such exports correctly are perceived as a vital source of 
foreign exchange and economic development. In fact, when new 
Marxist governments have come to power-even with the help of the 
Soviet Union, as in Angola, Guinea, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe-
they have tried to encourage, not cut, their mineral exports to and 
economic ties in general with the West. 
For these reasons, the resource war thesis appears implausible. Not 
that imports of manganese, cobalt, chromium, platinum, and the other 
mineral commodities from southern Africa may not from time to time 
be interrupted. This region is going through a turbulent transition as 
it sheds its colonial past and moves toward black majority rule. The 
odds are far from trivial on wars, embargoes, rebellions, and even 
cartel attempts as these newly independent states grapple with their 
internal difficulties and hostile neighbors. But to attribute the insecurity 
of mineral supplies from this region to Soviet policies in pursuing a 
resource war misses the fundamental causes of this insecurity. This is 
important not for ideological reasons, but because a mistaken diagnosis 
is apt to lead to inappropriate and unnecessarily costly and divisive 
policies. 
Dependence in perspective. Because it is so central to the question 
of import dependence, and in a way constitutes the heart of the case, 
we tum for a moment to figure 3-5. This impressive chart of net import 
reliance, published annually by the U.S. Bureau of Mines, also shows 
the value of U.S. imports for the same commodities for the same year. 
The result is illuminating. The two items showing sharp fluctuations, 
and of little relevance here, are gold and silver. They have been 
eliminated so as not to bias results in a given year. (Results will differ 
from year to year, but not severely.) In 1980 the total value of imports 
of the top five (" 100 percent") entries, which contribute to the strong 
visual impression of dependency, was $155 million, equivalent to what 
in that year the United States paid for fourteen hours of oil imports. 
If we aggregate the import value of all minerals-omitting gold and 
silver-that show a dependency greater than 50 percent, the total is 
$6.3 billion; and of this group, four of the five largest, representing 
two-thirds of that total-nickel, bauxite and alumina, zinc, and po-
tassium-present no import security problem, coming as they do 
from reliable sources, mostly in the Western Hemisphere. The large 
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import values are at the bottom of the chart, but here import dependence 
is small and, at times, not very meaningful in the context we are 
dealing with. The largest item by far, of course, is iron and steel 
products, with a 19 percent import dependence. And here the problem 
lies in a different sphere altogether, that is, U.S. industrial competi-
tiveness. What this juxtaposition suggests is that in value terms the 
disconcerting aspect of the graph on the left reflects only half the 
story. The full truth is that the country faces a number of separable 
supply issues involving commodities with modest dollar amounts, and 
thus more easily amenable to management, rather than a general threat 
to its survival. Modest value, while not indicating absence of a problem, 
does suggest manageability. While for lack of a nail a horse may be 
lost, it should be feasible to see to it that sufficient nails-or substi-
tutes-are at hand. We shall return to the matter presently when we 
discuss remedies. 
Surges in Demand 
Recent concern regarding future mineral shortages has focused pri-
marily on embargoes, civil disruptions, and other threats to the smooth 
flow of mineral trade, and to a lesser extent on resource depletion. 
Meanwhile, an equal or possibly greater problem has been largely 
ignored. From time to time unexpected surges in demand push demand 
substantially above its long-run trend. On such occasions, even though 
long-term supply is adequate, severe shortages occur that may persist 
for several years. 
Military emergencies and booms in the business cycle are the most 
common causes of demand surges. The manufacture of arms and other 
military equipment requires large amounts of specialty steels, copper, 
aluminum, magnesium, and other metals. Consequently, when a 
country becomes embroiled in a war, it finds that its immediate need 
for mineral commodities jumps substantially above peacetime require-
ments. 
Similarly, an economic boom can cause sharp surges in mineral 
demand. This is because the demand for most mineral commodities is 
derived largely from four end-use sectors-construction, capital equip-
ment, automobile and other transportation, and consumer durables. 
The output of these sectors fluctuates with the general level of economic 
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activity, but much more severely. When the economy is weak, their 
output may contract by 20 percent or more. Then when the economy 
recovers, their output rises sharply. However, as pointed out earlier, 
once full capacity is approached in the minerals industries, neither 
demand nor supply responds quickly to short-run changes in price. 
So, during an economic boom, either mineral prices must rise greatly 
to keep supply and demand in balance or producers must allocate or 
ration their available supplies. In either case, the result is shortages 
of mineral commodities. 
Strong cyclical swings are not new to the mineral industries. For 
example, many mergers at the turn of the last century led ultimately 
to the formation of the U.S. Steel Corporation, with command at that 
time over some two-thirds of the country's steel-making capacity; a 
major force driving the mergers was the desire by producers to gain 
some control over the volatile steel market. Still, several recent studies 
suggest that the disruptions caused by such market instability may be 
growing more severe. 
Increasing volatility. On the basis of a detailed examination of 
monthly fluctuations in the industrial production of the United States, 
Japan, Britain, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Italy, 
Chien concluded that the volatility of world industrial production, after 
declining from the 1950s to the 1960s, rose sharply during the 1970s.5 
His data indicate that this recent jump is due mainly to two factors-
an increase in the amplitude of the business cycle of the United States 
and other major countries, and a growing synchronization of business 
cycles among the major industrialized powers. Consistent with this 
finding is the fact that the last major wave of mineral shortages took 
place during 1973 and early 1974 when the economies of the industrial-
ized countries all were experiencing a strong economic boom. It was 
this situation that motivated Congress to establish the Supplies and 
Shortages Commission. 
Some recent evidence provided by Grubb also suggests that, over 
the last thirty years, mineral producers , fabricators , and speculators 
may have reduced their willingness to vary their inventories in a 
countercyclical manner. 6 In particular, he found that the combined 
refined copper stocks held by producers and fabricators rose by an 
average 700 tons when monthly copper consumption dropped 1,000 
tons below its five-year average in the 1950s. By the 1970s, this average 
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inventory adjustment had declined to less than 400 tons, suggesting 
that when the economy is expanding the mineral stocks accumulated 
during the previous market downturn and available to help meet a 
possible surge in demand are likely to be far smaller than was the case 
twenty to thirty years ago. To the extent this finding holds for other 
countries, for other mineral commodities, and for copper at other 
stages of production, it raises the likelihood that future shortages due 
to cyclical surges in demand will be more severe and disruptive than 
in the past. High interest rates, by raising the cost of carrying stocks, 
can be a powerful factor in this area. 
Summing Up 
To recapitulate, there are four potential threats to the future availability 
of mineral commodities-resource depletion, insufficient investment 
in mines and processing facilities, interruptions in production and 
trade, and unexpected surges in demand. In designing appropriate 
mineral policies for coping with shortages, it is important to note that 
resource depletion differs from the other threats in three respects. 
First, shortages caused by depletion occur over many years as real 
prices rise gradually, but persistently. In contrast, insufficient invest-
ment, interruptions in trade, and surges in demand are difficult to 
foresee and typically occur suddenly, with little or no warning. As a 
result, they tend to produce large jumps in price or actual physical 
shortages as producers ration their limited supplies. 
Second, depletion-induced shortages, should they occur, can be 
expected to persist for many years and perhaps indefinitely, as the 
technology required to offset the price-increasing effects of depletion 
cannot be generated quickly. The other threats to the availability of 
minerals, while they may produce severe problems for several years, 
are not likely to result in lasting shortages. Insufficient mine and 
processing capacity can be rectified within a few years by new 
investment. Similarly, strikes, cartels, embargoes, civil disruptions, 
and other interruptions in trade usually are relatively short lived; if 
longer-lasting, new sources of supply can be developed in unaffected 
areas. While this may require the mining of submarginal deposits at 
somewhat higher costs, the extra costs typically are not great. Unex-
pected surges in demand also tend to be temporary, whether they 
result from booms in the business cycle or military buildups. Again, 
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new capacity can be built within a few years if a surge in demand 
persists. To sum up this point: mineral shortages other than those 
generated by resource depletion are temporary. The disruption they 
cause generally is greatest immediately following their imposition, and 
then dissipates with time as consumers switch to alternative materials 
and producers develop new sources of supply. 
Finally, while new technology may or may not be able. to hold the 
cost-increasing effects of depletion at bay indefinitely, depletion is 
very unlikely to produce shortages over at least the next few decades, 
for reasons already discussed. This means that policies to prevent 
mineral shortages over the rest of this century, or to alleviate their 
adverse consequences, should be designed to cope with the short-
term-though potentially severe-shortages produced by insufficient 
investment, interruptions in trade, and sudden demand surges. 
Policy 
What role might policy play in reducing the probability of shortages 
and their potential adverse consequences? While certain government 
actions can enhance security of supply with little or no cost, most 
such actions already have been taken. Consequently, greater security 
usually must be bought, in the sense that it can be acquired only at a 
cost. Often the cost involves consumers paying higher prices for 
mineral commodities. 
In developing policies to protect the country from shortages, the 
government resembles an individual buying insurance. Two decisions 
are paramount. First, how much protection is desired? The answer 
depends on the cost of the insurance, the probability that shortages in 
fact will occur, the estimated adverse effects if they do, and the 
country's collective aversion to such risks. Second, how can the 
desired level of protection be acquired at least cost? Alternative 
policies must be reviewed in terms of the protection they afford and 
their costs. 
Complicating the analysis is the fact that protection is a multi-
dimensional concept. Some policies, for example, offer immediate-
but only temporary-relief from shortages. Others have longer lead 
times, but once in place provide permanent protection. Certain policies 
may be particularly effective in preventing shortages, but of little 
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assistance in alleviating shortages should they occur. Still other policies 
may be useful in dealing with particular types of shortages-those due 
to insufficient investment, for example-but not with other types. 
How best to reconcile these various aspects or dimensions of 
protection, how much protection overall is desirable, and what com-
bination of policies offers that level of protection at least cost? 
Judgments differ greatly, and so it is not surprising that U.S. mineral 
policy has been the focus of lively debate for years. The central 
elements of that policy since World War II, the recent push toward 
greater self-sufficiency, and an alternative policy that would rely 
primarily on stockpiling for greater protection against mineral shortages 
are examined next. 
Past Mineral Policy 
Many claim, usually with distress, that the United States never has 
had a mineral policy. And in the sense of a policy that is both 
comprehensive and internally consistent, they are right. Calls for such 
a policy, however, in our view are naive. As this volume documents 
in part, mineral policy is intertwined with energy, environmental, 
taxation, foreign, and defense policies. Government decisions in each 
of these areas affect ~nd thus help shape mineral policy. The latter 
simply is not of such importance that these impacts always are 
consistent from the perspective of those for whom minerals form the 
primary focus. 
In addition, the United States is among the world's largest mineral 
producers as well as consumers. So when mineral markets are out of 
balance-no matter in which direction-certain domestic groups are 
adversely affected and likely to tum to the political system for relief. 
As a result, mineral policy is not entirely shaped by fears of shortages 
and other consumer concerns, but rather is the product of a political 
process that takes into account the interests of producers and other 
special groups. Unsurprisingly, therefore, decisions made during short-
ages, when consumers are hard pressed for supplies and prices are 
rising sharply, often work at cross purposes with policies formulated 
when markets are depressed and producers in distress. 
Finally, the diversity within the mineral sector calls into question 
the feasibility of a comprehensive policy. The governmental decisions 
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needed for tin are quite different from those appropriate for aluminum, 
chromium, or molybdenum, let alone steel or copper. 
For these reasons, one should not expect to find in the past-or in 
the future, for that matter-a comprehensive and consistent U.S. 
mineral policy, except perhaps as a call for a ''sound and prosperous 
U.S. minerals industry" as is usually found as a preamble to a bill 
passed by Congress or a study sponsored by the White House. This 
does not mean, however, that there has been no policy. Myriad 
governmental decisions have shaped mineral policy; many are incon-
sistent in their effects on the mineral sector, and few are comprehensive 
in that they influence all or most mineral products. While an effort to 
identify all of these decisions would be futile, it is possible to identify 
two important elements or tenets that have characterized past U.S. 
mineral policy. 
Least-cost supplies. First, the federal government not only has 
permitted, but even has encouraged domestic consumers to obtain 
mineral supplies at lowest cost, regardless of where they are found. 
In this connection, it has helped U .S.-based mineral firms develop 
mines in Canada, Peru, Australia, and other countries by offering low-
cost loans, favorable taxation on foreign earnings, and insurance 
against expropriation and other political risks. The government also 
has resisted pressure from domestic producers for protection from 
imports. Of course, there have been some exceptions. President 
Eisenhower approved voluntary restrictions on lead and zinc imports 
in 1954, but only after efforts to appease hard-pressed domestic 
producers through expanded stockpile purchases proved inadequate. 
More recently, the carbon and specialty steel industries have received 
some protection but, again , only grudgingly. The more typical response 
to the pleas of domestic producers has not gone beyond the commis-
sioning of studies or public pronouncements regarding the importance 
of a strong domestic mineral industry. The mounting of a study, which 
postpones at least for several years the need for any concrete action, 
has proved especially effective in the highly cyclical mineral sector: 
by the time a study is completed, markets often have recovered. 
Stockpiling for security. But second, while encouraging domestic 
consumers to search worldwide for the lowest-cost sources for their 
mineral supplies, U.S. mineral policy has not completely ignored 
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security issues. Here, however, instead of promoting self-sufficiency, 
it has relied primarily on stockpiling. 
Legislation authorizing the federal government to stockpile mineral 
commodities goes back to 1939. However, wartime needs and then 
higher budgetary priorities during the immediate postwar period de-
layed the actual accumulation of stocks. It was the start of the Korean 
conflict in June of 1950 that eventually induced Congress to provide 
substantial funds for stockpiling. After this war was over, stockpiling 
continued, in part to bolster prices and assist the depressed domestic 
mineral industry. In addition, as Eckes has noted,7 President Eisen-
hower took a personal interest in maintaining and increasing the 
stockpile: 
Through the mid- l 950s, the Eisenhower administration pursued a 
systematic policy of building up materials stock piles, and the 
explanation for this vigorous policy rests with Eisenhower himself. 
The old general believed raw materials were better than gold ; "the 
materials within our stock piles represent insurance against disaster,'' 
he told friends at a White House stag dinner. In 1956, when other 
members of the National Security Council suggested the government 
economize and cut back on its mobilization stock pile, because raw 
materials reserves caused uncertainty in the commodities markets 
and because these inventories seemed anachronistic in an age of 
atomic war, Eisenhower stood firm . 
By the end of the 1950s, the United States had in place a substantial 
stockpile, containing many of the mineral commodities it imports. 
Since that time, the stockpile has received much attention. Its size 
and composition, as well as the conditions under which its stocks are 
released, all have been subjected to considerable scrutiny and ques-
tioning. During the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, stockpiling 
goals were reduced by assuming a one-year, rather than a three- to 
five-year, war. This allowed the government to declare its holdings of 
some commodities in excess, and to sell off parts of the stockpile to 
alleviate inflation, domestic shortages, and budgetary constraints. More 
recently, goals again have been set on the assumption of a three-year 
war. As a consequence, the government now is buying certain minerals, 
such as cobalt, that no longer meet stockpile goals, while selling 
others, such as tin. At present, the composition of the stockpile is 
badly out of balance when measured against its objectives. Forty 
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percent of its holdings are surplus to goal; on the other hand, its gross 
acquisition needs are equal to the total value of the stockpile. 
Despite such imbalance, the United States has for twenty-five years 
possessed substantial public stocks of the major mineral commodities 
that it imports. These stocks over this period have constituted the 
country's principal defense against an unexpected interruption in 
foreign supplies. 
Growing Pressure for Greater Self-Sufficiency 
As a result of the policy just described, the United States-despite its 
tremendous mineral wealth-relies heavily on imports for many mineral 
commodities. This dependence often is contrasted with the almost 
complete self-sufficiency of the Soviet Union, which, for a number of 
reasons, has followed a deliberate policy of resource autarky. This 
has been quite costly in some instances, but the Soviet Union does 
produce almost all of the mineral products it needs . 
Contrary to some popular argument, however, the United States 
has not passed through a major transformation over the last thirty 
years, moving from the status of a "have" to a "have-not" nation, 
from relative self-sufficiency with a net export balance to critical 
dependence on imports. The case for dramatically increased vulnera-
bility-apparently perpetuated by the country's experience with pe-
troleum-simply is not valid for the nonfuel minerals. For years, the 
United States has acquired most or all of its supplies of many important 
mineral commodities from abroad. In 1950, for example, foreign mines 
provided 71 percent of the country's bauxite, 77 percent of its 
manganese, 80 percent of its tungsten, 91 percent of its platinum, 92 
percent of its cobalt, 99 percent of its nickel, and 100 percent of its 
chromium. This is basically the same list of commodities that generates 
most of the attention and concern today. Moreover, for some com-
modities, such as tungsten, domestic production actually has increased 
and import dependence decreased. 
What then has changed? Why the growing interest in greater self-
sufficiency? 
Increasing imports. The United States has become a major importer 
of iron ore and steel, while in the early years after World War II it 
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was largely self-sufficient in iron ore and a net exporter of steel. 
Imports of bauxite and alumina also have increased over the years, 
though, as noted, bauxite from abroad already accounted for nearly 
three-quarters of domestic consumption more than thirty years ago. 
Processing shifts. Some shift in processing capacity overseas also 
has taken place. Aluminum now is being imported as alumina as well 
as bauxite. Zinc is entering the country primarily in the form of refined 
metal rather than as ores and concentrates, and the processing of 
ferroalloys increasingly is taking place abroad. Such shifts raise 
questions about the usefulness of domestic low-grade ores: can they 
bear the costs of having to be shipped abroad for processing or will 
they become submarginal? The transfer of processing also increases 
the steps in the production chain over which the United States has no 
direct control, and so is widely presumed to increase the country's 
vulnerability to supply interruptions. This, however, need not be the 
case. For example, alumina-producing plants are built to treat a 
particular type of bauxite. If imports are disrupted, other types of 
bauxite cannot readily be substituted. Alumina, on the other hand, is 
a homogenous commodity, so domestic aluminum producers can feed 
their smelters with alumina from anywhere in the world. This increases 
the choice of alternative sources of supply in the event of an interrup-
tion. The lower cost of shipping processed minerals, as they contain 
less waste , also tends to increase the distances from which alternative 
supplies can be shipped economically. 
Consumption growth. Perhaps a more significant development over 
the last thirty years has been the substantial growth in total consumption 
and variety of end-use applications of a number of mineral products 
the United States imports. Specialty steels and other alloys, in 
particular, have found their way into many new high-technology and 
military products. Consequently, unless counteracted by stockpile 
releases, an interruption in supplies today could have more extensive 
and serious consequences than in the early postwar period. 
Political changes. Finally, two important political developments 
apparently have increased the risks associated with mineral imports . 
The British Commonwealth, the French Community, and the other 
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colonial empires that once controlled much of the developing world 
largely have disappeared as operating entities. The newly independent 
states that have emerged in their place are not always able to maintain 
the security and political stability required for continuous mining 
operations. 
In addition, the economic nationalism and the fear of foreign 
ownership that swept through the former colonies, and also the 
developing countries of Latin America and developed countries, have 
undermined the major multinational mining corporations that for 
decades have dominated the production of mineral commodities, from 
exploration to marketing. In some countries the properties of these 
firms have been nationalized and now are run by the government. 
Other countries have forced companies to divest partial ownership to 
domestic interests, and still others have imposed taxes or regulations 
that have threatened the economic viability of company operations. 
For decades, the United States and other major industrialized countries 
have relied on these firms to supply minerals their economies require. 
Their waning influence calls into question their ability to continue to 
perform this function. 
Reducing Dependence 
Although import dependence is not new, the recent interest in greater 
self-sufficiency in the United States is not hard to understand. By 
increasing domestic production and lowering imports, so the argument 
goes, the country can reduce its exposure or vulnerability to mineral 
shortages. 
Protectionism. Among the various measures advanced for pro-
moting domestic production is more protection from imports. Here 
the advocates of greater self-sufficiency have enjoyed some success 
in recent years. As noted earlier, voluntary quotas, trigger prices, and 
other forms of protection in particular have limited specialty and 
carbon steel imports . There also have been efforts to curtail imports 
of copper, zinc, and ferroalloys, although they have not been as 
successful. 
Tax changes. Changes in tax policy that would reduce the incen-
tives for U.S. mineral firms to invest abroad also are being advocated. 
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Removal of the depletion allowance on foreign mining and the deferral 
of taxes on income earned abroad until repatriation have been sug-
gested. In addition, the government-sponsored Overseas Private In-
vestment Corporation could discontinue offering to domestic mining 
companies investing abroad insurance against expropriation and other 
political risks. 
Regulatory relief. Also proposed is the relaxation of worker health 
and safety and environmental regulations that have been imposed on 
industry over the past two decades. These regulations raise domestic 
production costs, particularly in the mineral sector, and so increase 
the attractiveness of developing new mines and processing facilities 
abroad. The recent decision of Anaconda to close its smelter at Butte, 
Montana, and to ship copper concentrates to Japan for smelting often 
is cited as an illustration of this point, as this decision was made in 
part-according to the company-to avoid the costs of meeting envi-
ronmental standards at the Butte smelter. 
Exploiting federal lands. The opening of more federal lands to 
mineral exploration and development also is favored. Such lands 
account for about one-third of the country's surface, including Alaska, 
and contain many of the geologically more promising areas. Over the 
last twenty years, a large portion of this publicly held territory was 
set aside for other purposes, though there is much controversy over 
how large that portion really is, and how severe the restrictions are. 
Direct subsidies. More direct subsidies, such as long-term purchase 
contracts at guaranteed prices, also are being proposed. Such supports, 
established in the Defense Production Act of 1950, were used in the 
early 1950s to encourage the rapid expansion of mineral capacity 
during the Korean conflict. Today they could be used to stimulate 
domestic production. For example, at the Blackbird cobalt deposit in 
Idaho, production might be feasible at four to five times the 1982 spot 
price of about $6 per pound of imported cobalt. Platinum in Montana 
is another possibility. 
This incomplete list of the various measures being advocated to 
promote self-sufficiency illustrates the breadth and diversity of the 
proposed responses to the growing pressure for a major shift in U.S. 
mineral policy. While the push for change is largely the result of greater 
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concern over the security of mineral supplies, it has been reinforced 
and accentuated by the deep and prolonged recession in mineral 
markets that has forced domestic producers to look to the government 
for relief. So far this alliance of interests has not fundamentally altered 
the postwar policy of relatively free mineral trade. Some government 
actions recently have been more consistent with the policy of self-
sufficiency than free trade, but they still are exceptions. Whether the 
old policy eventually will crumble and make way for one emphasizing 
self-sufficiency is unknown. The possibility certainly exists. Whether 
such a change is desirable is considered next. 
The Stockpiling Alternative 
A shift in mineral policy toward greater self-sufficiency is attractive 
politically, as it would help the distressed domestic mineral sector 
while enhancing the security of supplies for consumers. However, 
greater security can be acquired only at a cost. If the country wants 
to buy more protection or insurance against the threat of shortages, it 
can do so in different ways. The rational policy is the one that buys 
the desired level of protection at the lowest possible price. This raises 
the question, Is greater self-sufficiency the most efficient way to reduce 
the country's vulnerability? Or can other policies provide the desired 
protection at lower costs? 
No single answer is valid for all mineral commodities. For some, 
particularly those where marginal domestic producers are almost 
competitive with foreign firms supplying the U.S. market, self-suffi-
ciency may be relatively inexpensive and so the best policy. However, 
for most mineral commodities, this is not likely to be the case. 
The cost of greater self-sufficiency can be high in both economic 
and political terms. Poorer-grade and more difficult to process domestic 
ores are more expensive to exploit. The resulting higher prices that 
domestic consumers must pay are not merely transfer payments from 
them to producers, but entail real costs in the sense that more labor, 
capital, and energy must be consumed to meet the country's mineral 
needs. Nor do these costs occur just once or for a temporary period: 
they continue year after year for as long as public policy requires or 
encourages the use of poorer-quality domestic resources. The social 
and political costs associated with self-sufficiency involve the sacrifice 
of other social and public objectives, such as a cleaner environment, 
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safer working conditions, or the preservation of wilderness areas. They 
also may compromise various foreign policy goals, such as the economic 
integration of the Western world through greater trade, or the economic 
development of Third World countries. 
In addition, a policy of self-sufficiency implicitly equates vulnerability 
with import dependence. While dependence is one determinant of 
vulnerability ,8 there are many others-the diversity of foreign suppliers, 
the particular countries from which imports are obtained, domestic 
opportunities for material substitution, the economic and strategic 
importance of the end uses of mineral imports, opportunities for 
recycling, and the level of public and private stocks. As a result, no 
simple linear relationship exists between vulnerability and import 
dependence. Vulnerability can be high even in the absence of imports, 
and low despite considerable import dependence. A policy that em-
phasizes self-sufficiency and neglects the other factors that determine 
vulnerability is not likely to be efficient, but it may be very expensive. 
A First Line of Defense 
What then are the alternatives? In our view, stockpiling in many 
instances is likely to offer the most protection for the least cost, and 
deserves far more attention in the current debate over U.S. mineral 
policy than it is receiving. If the shortages the country is likely to 
encounter in the future will be of relatively short duration, as was 
concluded earlier, stockpiles are ideal. They provide an alternative 
source of supplies when normal channels are disrupted, without 
diverting investment and production from low-cost areas. Thus, they 
minimize the adverse effects of short-term shortages in a way that 
does not reduce over the longer run the efficiency of world production 
and the benefits of trade. Even at worst-if shortages persist for longer 
than expected and exhaust accumulated stockpiles-stockpiling still 
serves as an effective first line of defense by providing a cushion of 
time that allows the country to increase domestic production, to 
substitute alternative materials, or to develop other more permanent 
adjustments. 
Stockpiling often is dismissed as too expensive. This conclusion, 
however, usually rests on a misunderstanding that confuses the real 
costs of stockpiling with its acquisition costs. The funds expended to 
purchase or accumulate stocks reflect merely the exchange of one 
asset for another. Just as an individual is no poorer after he draws 
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down his savings account to buy a house, the government is no poorer 
after it has exchanged public revenues for copper, chromium, cobalt, 
or other mineral products. It may have a liquidity problem in marshaling 
the necessary funds, but the cost of the purchase does not reflect the 
consumption of real resources. 
There are, of course, real costs associated with stockpiling. First, 
and most important, are the interest or opportunity costs on the capital 
tied up in maintaining stocks. Other resources also are consumed in 
holding and administering stockpiles. However, these costs generally 
are much lower than those incurred in promoting self-sufficiency, for 
stockpiling does not divert mining and processing from low- to high-
cost areas. 
This suggests that the recent push for greater self-sufficiency is 
misdirected , and that the postwar policy of encouraging access to low-
cost mineral supplies should be continued, using stockpiles to reduce 
the country's vulnerability to shortages. Such a policy, however, places 
a heavy burden on stockpiling, and calls for a careful review of its 
proper role. 
Disposal Policy 
In the past, the government has accumulated and held strategic 
stockpiles under legislation that authorizes their disposal only during 
military emergencies. In practice, the government has used stockpile 
purchases and sales to stabilize mineral markets and for other non-
military purposes. However, as Gauntt has shown,9 such efforts have 
not been particularly successful, in part because their primary military 
purpose eventually constrained their flexibility in dealing with other 
mineral problems. A broader role for stockpiling that encompasses 
more than just military emergencies may be needed. 
Such a change in the role of stockpiling would require a clearer 
specification of the purposes of stockpiling and the conditions under 
which sales were to occur. On occasion, the government has used 
stockpile sales to reduce the federal budget deficit, and to prevent 
producers from raising prices. Ways to prevent such unintended uses 
of the stockpile are needed, particularly if its role is extended. 
This raises the possibility that part or all of the stocks that mineral 
policy supports as insurance against shortages might be held by firms 
and other private interests rather than by the federal government. This 
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could make it more difficult for public officials to use the stockpile for 
unintended purposes, and might increase support for a broader stock-
piling policy from the mineral industry, which views stockpiling with 
substantial misgivings. If properly designed, such a policy also might 
reduce the adverse effects that public stocks have on the incentives 
of firms to hold their stocks. The government could encourage such 
holdings through various measures that would help the private sector 
defray the additional costs. 
Thus, while continuing a U.S. mineral policy that favors free access 
to low-cost mineral supplies worldwide and uses stockpiles to protect 
the country against shortages has much to commend it, stockpiling's 
part in the policy could be enhanced. In particular, a broader role that 
envisages the use of stockpiles for more than just military emergen-
cies-as is now the case for petroleum stockpiles-with the private 
sector playing a more direct and active role in the actual accumulation 
and. maintenance of stocks, seems worthy of serious consideration. 
More narrowly, a review is overdue of the military scenario underlying 
the stockpile objectives, as of the rules governing both acquisition and 
release decisions. 
Summing Up 
In summary, there are legitimate concerns for the uninterrupted flow 
to U.S. industry of a variety of minerals, some for the long run and 
some more of a short-term nature. The market provides for the needed 
adjustments, but temporary imbalance between supply and demand, 
signaled by changes in prices, cannot be avoided. When the cry of 
"shortages" goes up, care must be taken to diagnose the cause or 
causes, lest public policy, responding to pressures, thwart rather than 
support these adjustments. 
Yet there are some potential perturbations in production or trade 
that call for government intervention in the form of policies that are 
best thought of as buying insurance. A thorough review and rethinking 
of concepts as well as implementation seems indicated, but all things 
considered, adequate stockpiles at present remain the most readily 
available and lowest-cost remedy. 
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